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Abstract 
Does the timing of labour earnings taxation encroaches upon capital income taxation and individual 
risk-taking investment decisions, i.e. portfolio selection? This paper presents the results of a 
laboratory experiment that is, contrary to previous approaches, not restricted to the analysis of 
capital income taxation (fully taxable vs. tax-exempt investment earnings) and individual risk-
taking, but adds other dimensions of taxation, i.e. deferral or immediate labour earnings taxation. 
Empirical findings support the view that tax framing effects affect tax burden visibility, changing 
individuals´ risk-taking propensity substantially. A tax system applying deferral taxation of labour 
earnings turns out to be more attractive to taxpayers with regard to risk-taking investment than 
immediate labour taxation with tax-exempt earnings from investment. 
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Tax policy has various, often conflicting objectives. A hands-on approach to tax policy is often 
equated with the isolated examination and modification of certain tax schemes in tax law. 
Economists and economic science have used to focus on a single component of a tax system, 
however, too readily forget to look at the bigger picture. Capital income taxation is a primary 
concern in tax policy, covered by heated debates over its divisive nature. The tax treatment of 
capital income is a substantial but no isolated feature of every income tax system and needs to be 
evaluated in a wider context considering other substantial tax system components, such as the 
taxation of labour earnings.1 The basic view on the issue of income taxation is to define a taxpayer´s 
biography as his/her cumulative tax burden over time, resulting from labour and (subsequent) 
capital income taxation. When thinking about the chronological order of taxation of labour and 
capital income, two general methods emerge. The first, more widely-used approach separates the 
two dimensions. It starts with the generation of labour earnings and its immediate taxation, followed 
by the taxpayer´s net-of-tax investment decision and the subsequent taxation of income from 
capital. The second, alternative method defers the taxation of labour earnings. Here, the investment 
decision is based on gross labour earnings. Labour earnings taxation is shifted to the end and takes 
place at the same time as the taxation of the investment earnings2.3 For the latter, there are basically 
three main principles in taxation (with an arbitrary number of variations): (1) Earnings from 
investment are taxed in full at ordinary rates. (2) Earnings from investment are exempted from the 
income tax base and taxed at a schedular tax rate, which is typically lower than the ordinary income 
tax rate. (3) Earnings from investment are exempted from the tax base and not subject to income 
taxation at all.  
In Germany, the Retirement Income Act of 2005 has established new regulatory changes affecting 
the tax treatment during the labour income (saving) phase and future pension income. Its main 
feature is the gradual transition to a deferral taxation of contributions to private pension plans. Since 
obviously policymakers are paying more and more attention to the deferral aspect of taxation, 
empirical evidence for behavioural responses to deferral taxation of labour earnings could be 
                                                 
1 For the sake of simplicity, the term “capital income” is used to cover both the positive difference (gains) and the 
negative difference (losses). 
2 When using the term “investment earnings”, I only refer to earnings from financial investments by taxpayers. I do not 
examine investment earnings by corporations or investment in human capital assets. 
3 A well-known application of deferral labour earnings taxation is the tax treatment of taxpayer´s investments in private 
pension plans. US individual retirement accounts (IRA) and the 401(k) retirement plan benefit from deferral 
taxation, meaning the postponement of taxes on a portion of labour income and subsequent investment returns until 
the withdrawal.. 
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helpful and valuable for not only new scientific insights but also for tax policy makers, designing 
(more) effective tax systems.  
This paper addresses the question how different combinations of labour and capital income tax rules 
affect taxpayers´ allocation strategy, i.e. their risk-taking behaviour. The remaining part of this 
paper is organised as follow. The second section gives an overview of the development of 
(experimental) research in the field of risky investment and capital income taxation. It also outlines 
the contribution of this study to the existing literature. The following section sets out the hypothesis 
and describes the experimental design. Empirical results are presented in the fourth section. The 
fifth section is devoted to a discussion of the major findings and their implication for tax policy. 
  
2 Previous Research  
Pros and cons of capital income taxation have emerged in the theoretical public finance literature 
over the last decades.4 There has been considerable scientific and political debate on the question of 
whether and how earnings from investment should be included in the income tax base. Pioneer 
theoretical contributions by Fisher (1897), (1906) and (1937), Ramsey (1927) and Seltzer (1950) 
have ignited the debate on how the taxation of capital income “[…] can be easily applied in practice 
while being, at the same time, sound in theory.”5 Research in this area is approached from different 
economic angles. It can be roughly divided into two parts of economic science, i.e. macroeconomic 
vs. microeconomic research. At the macro level, the mobility of capital, the welfare cost of capital 
income taxation, its proper measurement have been the subject of a long and lively debate led by 
economists such as Kaldor (1937), Harberger (1964a, 1964b, 1966), Levhari and Sheshinski (1972), 
Andrews (1974), Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976), Feldstein (1976), Atkinson and Sandmo (1980), 
Stiglitz (1983), Slemrod (1988), Auerbach (1992) and Kaplow (1994). They advocate the 
elimination or the reduction of capital income taxation to foster capital accumulation and economic 
growth.  
On a micro level, a primary concern in tax policy and economic science is the effect of taxation on 
the demand for risky assets. Asea and Turnovsky (1997) emphasize that “it is central to one of the 
most challenging questions facing academics and policymakers […].”6  Domar and Musgrave 
(1944) pioneered the analysis of taxation and its impact on taxpayers´ propensity to invest in risky 
                                                 
4 Poterba (2001) gives a comprehensive overview of debates and developments in this research area and emphasises 
“the tax rules that apply to income from capital are the most complicated part of most modern income tax systems.”  
5 Fisher (1906), p. 3. 
6 Asea and Turnovsky (1997), p. 56. 
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assets. Successive theoretical and empirical literature suggests a wide range of dimensions, 
illustrating how capital income taxation may affect individual investment behaviour and risk-taking. 
Using general expected utility maximisation or general equilibrium models, theoretical 
contributions investigate the demand for risky assets induced by income, wealth or different forms 
of taxation (e.g. Mossin (1968), Stiglitz (1969), Finn (1977), Fellingham and Wolson (1978), 
Schneider (1980), Mintz (1981), Bamberg and Richter (1984), Bulow and Summers (1984), Balcer 
and Judd (1987), Bamberg and Richter (1988) and Weisbach (2004)).  
Panel data methods and laboratory experiments are widely used in empirical tax research to identify 
tax effects on individual risky investments. Although a clear and precise separation is not always 
possible and necessary, empirical research typically approaches the role of capital income taxation 
in (1) the realization of profits (Yitzhaki (1979), Slemrod (1989), Burman and Randolph (1994), 
Landsman and Shackelford (1995), Mariger (1995), Auerbach et al. (2000), Auerbach and Siegel 
(2000), Auten and Clotfelter (2000), Eichner and Sinai (2000), Jacob and Alstadsaeter (2012)) , (2) 
determining the set and shifting of assets owned by an individual (Butters and Thompson (1953), 
Elton and Gruber (1978), Agell and Edin (1990), Maki (1996), Poterba and Weisbenner (2001)) and 
(3) the amount invested in and the choice between risky assets. The current study addresses the 
latter by a laboratory experiment approach. 
Experiment-based research questions aim to identify either aggregated dimensions, i.e. market 
transactions, the pricing of risky assets and equilibrium prices, or risky asset investment by 
individuals. It is straightforward to describe the most prominent papers of both research fields in 
greater detail, i.e. experimental designs, economic environments and main empirical findings. From 
an aggregate perspective, Davis and Swenson´s experiment (1993) approaches neoclassical 
predictions of investment behaviour. An artificial economy with sequential market transactions was 
utilised. Three types of economic agents (factor sellers, output producers, and output buyers) 
interact with each other to simulate market behaviour and price setting. The research question 
addressed is whether a capital investment friendly tax system is eligible to foster investment in 
depreciable assets. Davis and Swenson´s results imply that accelerated tax depreciation or 
investment tax credits are eligible to stimulate demand for investment assets. Anderson and Butler 
(1997) examine how preferential treatments of capital gains, i.e. lower tax rate and an unlimited 
capital loss deduction, drives the market prices of risky assets. They find that market prices of risky 
assets are both affected by the level of the preferential tax rate and the amount of risk. An unlimited 
deduction for capital losses has no significant impact on the risky tax-favoured asset´s price. Boylan 
and Frischmann (2006) designed a set of experimental markets to examine how the degree of tax 
rate visibility influences trading prices and quantities. Students volunteered to participate as buyers 
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and sellers. Their findings indicate that buyers facing high tax complexity systematically overpay 
the sellers for the risky assets compared to their counterparts in low-complexity markets. 
Swenson´s study (1989) has ignited the experimental analysis of taxation and its influence on 
individual investment decisions. 56 students served as buyers and sellers and participated in four 
separate markets sequentially. Swenson compares the tax induced demand for a riskless and a risky 
asset in different tax environments, i.e. no taxes, proportional taxes, progressive taxes with a limited 
loss offset, and proportional taxes with a tax credit. His findings are in line with predictions from 
theory, revealing that progressive (proportional) taxes decrease (increase) the demand for risky 
assets. Eliminating the tax credit, proportional taxes cause no significant increase in demand, 
contradicting the theory. King and Wallin (1990) designed two laboratory experiments for 60 
student volunteers to examine the effect of income tax rate structures on the level of risky asset 
investment. Using a slightly different economic environment (no taxes, proportional taxes, 
progressive taxes), their results confirm that a progressive tax system reduces the holdings of risky 
assets, whereas investment decisions are merely distinguishable between the proportional tax and 
the no tax scenario. Meade´s examination (1990) addresses the lock-in effect caused by capital 
gains taxation. The 64 students participating in her study were required to choose between six 
investment options. Her main findings support the hypothesis that the deferral aspect of capital 
gains taxation induces a lock-in effect and hampers new risky investments. Meade concluded that 
the taxation of capital gains upon realisation does no help to foster the tax policy goal of promoting 
risky investments.  
Conducting a repeated-measure experiment, Meade (1995) tested how different tax systems affect 
saving and risk-taking behaviour. Risk-taking behaviour is measured by the relative amount 
invested in the riskier of two assets available. In her experiment, 90 undergraduate students were 
assigned to different tax regimes, i.e. income and consumption tax regimes. Her between-subjects 
design included two groups and three treatments to analyse both income tax and consumption tax 
systems as well as future tax rate (un)certainty. Providing empirical support for previous analytical 
work, her experimental findings suggest that taxpayers rethink their risk-sharing arrangement, when 
the structure of a tax regime changes. Results indicate that the composition of a tax regime can have 
significant and multidimensional effects on taxpayer´s propensity to deal with risk. She finds that 
income (consumption) taxes encourage (discourage) risk-taking behaviour when the tax rate is 
known. Meade identifies different effects of future and present tax rate (un)certainty within the two 
tax regimes. When present and future tax rates are uncertain, risk-taking declines significantly with 
dissimilar extent for both tax systems. When these tax rates are certain, the consumption tax regime 
is neutral with respect to risk-taking.  
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Apart from these studies, the perception of taxation and the influence of tax framing on tax 
perception have been found to explain empirical observations deviating from theoretical predictions 
(Lewis (1978), Fujii and Hawley (1988), Rupert and Fischer (1995), Sausgruber and Tyran (2005), 
Chetty et al. (2009)). Tax framing effects are a useful tool to explain why individual behaviour 
deviates, when net-of-tax outcomes are described or presented differently. Cullis et al. (2006) 
emphasize that “the same underlying process can be framed very differently, so that individuals 
confronted with the same information cast in different forms (e.g. as a potential gain or loss, a 
decision tree or in words, etc.) can be induced to systematically alter their choices.”7 The resulting 
lower degree of tax system salience and/or taxpayers´ awareness of their true tax burden are 
assigned substantial explanatory power to rationalize irrational taxpayer behaviour.  
This way of thinking has been incorporated in several experimental settings dealing with the 
analysis of capital income taxation and individual risk-taking. De Bartolome (1995) tested whether 
the average or marginal tax rate are used by taxpayers, when being confronted with risky 
investments. His findings indicate that the presentation of the tax schedule is of substantial 
importance for individual decision-making. The experimental set-up by Fochmann et al. (2012) 
models three tax treatments to examine the effect of various loss deduction rules. In each treatment 
(no taxation, proportional income taxation without loss deduction and proportional income taxation 
with capped or partial loss deduction), the two investment alternatives generate identical expected 
after-tax payoffs. Comparing the number of risk seeking and risk averse investors, Fochmann et al. 
found no significant difference in the case of without taxation. The same was true for the 
proportional income taxation without loss deduction rules. The introduction of a capped or partial 
loss deduction rule produced a substantial and significant perception bias towards risk seeking 
investment behaviour. Fochmann et al. concluded that the loss deduction rules in income taxation 
are overestimated by taxpayers, leading to an increased willingness to take risk. 
Labour taxation usually precedes capital income taxation and taxpayers´ decision to take risk. This 
paper provides a promising approach on how to identify the extent to which taxpayers´ risky 
investment choices between two assets are affected, when different tax rules are applied to known 
labour earnings and uncertain future earnings from investment. It contributes to the empirical 
experiment-based literature and complements previous research in three ways.  
First, contrary to previous experimental approaches, the analysis does not only cover capital income 
taxation but the coexistence of labour and capital income taxation within a tax system and offers a 
more realistic set-up. At least to my knowledge, there has not been yet an experimental approach, 
                                                 
7 Cullis et al. (2006), p. 305. 
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combining deferral taxation of gross labour earnings with (preferential) capital income taxation in a 
real effort experiment. The addition of labour income taxation as an essential component of the 
overall taxation process offers the unique opportunity to control for different dimensions of 
taxation, affecting taxpayers´ investment behaviour. The student participants of the laboratory 
experiment were required to carry out a real effort task where real money had to be earned and 
could be invested in two different risky assets afterwards, modelling the often neglected labour 
component in experimental analysis.  Contrary to other studies, participants were not endowed with 
exogenous or artificial money or investment points. This approach is eligible to simulate a more 
realistic economic environment in the laboratory experiment.  
Second, opposing previous approaches by Swenson (1989) as well as King and Wallin (1990), risk-
taking propensity is not measured by the relative or absolute risky asset holdings but by the overall 
portfolio variance, resulting from the relative demand for the two risky assets. This measure is more 
elaborate than the absolute or relative amount invested in the riskier asset. It accounts directly for 
the interdependence between the relative demands for the two risky assets and their impact on the 
overall portfolio variance, to which the taxpayer selects to be exposed. This approach can be 
considered a substantial methodological improvement.  
Third, on the one hand the results confirm the appealing aspect of increased liquidity, resulting from 
deferral taxation of labour income. On the other hand they provide strong empirical evidence for the 
existence of tax framing effects, when income tax systems are realigned without changing the 
overall strain on the taxpayer. Deferral labour income taxation turns out to encroach upon the 
individual investment decision, i.e. the demand for portfolios with a higher variance ceteris paribus 
increases.   
Empirical findings which are closer to individual behaviour in reality enable tax policymakers to 
discuss in greater detail the role and usefulness of deferral taxation in behavioural economics. This 
study provides helpful findings on risk-taking behaviour. It analyzes whether theoretical and 
empirical results derived from immediate labour taxation frameworks are still valid or need to be 
rethought, when the taxation of labour earnings is also considered or changes. The paper focuses on 
the joint impact of immediate and deferral taxation of taxpayers´ labour earnings and capital income 
taxation on risk-taking behaviour. This approach departs from previous, mostly theoretical work on 
tax-deferred investment opportunities through the use of a promising experimental research design. 
It broadens current empirical research by adding another dimension, i. e. tax-induced individual 
investment decisions after a real effort task. The experiment draws attention to the individual 
decision of private risk-taking, when different tax systems apply to the taxation of labour earnings 
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and investment earnings. To my knowledge, this paper also presents the first experimental 
investigation approaching the identification of a perception bias resulting from deferral earnings 
taxation and its “abnormal” consequences on individual risk-taking behaviour. By providing new 
insights into the effects of deferral taxation on microeconomic investment behaviour, the study 
advances the political and scientific debate on the appropriateness of different income tax systems, 
featuring a different degree of salience and net-of-tax visibility. 
 
3 Methodology 
3.1 Hypotheses  
Economic theory does not provide any imperturbable axiomatic picture of how capital income 
taxation and individual risk-taking of investors are related. Describing their utility functions by 
plausible combinations of the related measures of absolute and relative risk aversion, most 
analytical contributions assert that the level of risky investment will increase when a proportional 
income tax applies to earnings from investment.8 However, the seminal paper by Domar and 
Musgrave (1944) indicates that analytical precision blurs when an asymmetric treatment of profits 
and losses applies. Schneider´s (1980) critical voice reinforces the indeterminateness of taxation 
and individual risk-taking. He argues that “the effects of progressive taxation in general and of 
proportional taxation (except under very restrictive conditions) cannot be predicted […]”. Previous 
approaches have produced rather ambiguous results, often challenging pure rational theoretical 
predictions. It is revealed that the empirical implementation of a tax system, assumptions about 
economic agents and their more or less comprehensive knowledge of the tax system are crucial for a 
possible discrepancy between theory and reality.  
Most previous empirical studies consider capital income taxation and individual risk-taking in 
isolation by neglecting and/or eliminating other aspects of an income tax system such as its 
salience, taxpayer´s imperfect rationality, psychological effects and (mis)perceptions. The question 
whether the design of a proportional income tax system, comprising alternative tax rules for labour 
and capital income, dis- or encourage risk-taking has not been answered yet. Four different tax 
systems are used in the analysis of individual investment behaviour. The tax systems discriminate 
between the taxation of labour earnings and investment earnings. Table 1 depicts two (possible) 
dimensions of income taxation and their coexistence within an income tax system, creating four 
different tax regimes.  
                                                 










Are earnings from 
investment subject 
to taxation? 
A  Immediate Yes 
B Immediate No 
C  Deferral Yes 
D  Deferral No 
Table 1 – Tax system structure 
 
Experiments offer the unique opportunity of empirical tests to explore the genuine driving force of 
taxation on investment behaviour and shed light on the puzzling issue of taxation and risk-taking. 
The approach chosen in the laboratory experiment is not restricted to the analysis of capital income 
taxation only, but expands the economic environment by another dimension, i.e. the taxation of 
labour. Most analytical and empirical work has implicitly only addressed the relation between 
capital income taxation and individual risk-taking, ruling out the aspect of labour taxation. The 
combination of labour and capital income taxation is a more elaborate experimental set-up, 
challenging and complicating analytical rigor and precise empirical evidence.  
There are four hypotheses to be tested, addressing  taxpayers´ risk-taking behaviour. The term “risk-
taking behaviour” is used to describe the individual decision of a taxpayer to choose between two 
assets, bearing a different amount of risk. The degree of individual risk-taking is measured by the 
overall portfolio variance, which depends on the relative amounts invested in the two assets. 
Participants had complete freedom, when deciding about their disposable earnings and their 
allocation strategy. They were allowed to invest in just one or both assets or nothing at all. 
Taxpayer i is more risk-taking than taxpayer j, if the portfolio variance selected by i is higher than 
the portfolio variance chosen by  j. 
When thinking about deferral taxation, a prominent argument is the appealing (main) effect of 
increased liquidity, resulting from the postponement of labour income taxation. It can be regarded 
as a tax incentive to stimulate individual risk-taking propensity. This effect should be observable for 
both scenarios where deferral taxation of labour earnings ceteris paribus applies. The first research 
hypothesis addresses the attribute of increased liquidity and can be stated as: 
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H1: In a tax system with deferral taxation of labour earnings (tax systems C and D), taxpayers 
select a riskier portfolio than in a tax system with immediate labour taxation (A and B).  
 
The second research hypothesis deals with another part of taxation, i.e. the influence of capital 
income taxation on risk-taking behaviour. In my experimental setting, capital income is either fully 
taxable or tax-exempt. The tax treatment implies a consistent treatment of positive and negative 
investment earnings within a tax system, meaning a complete or no loss offset in the case of a 
negative outcome. When earnings from investment are subject to taxation, the Treasury absorbs part 
of the investor’s risk and can be regarded as a partial insurance against losses. Proportional capital 
income taxation with a homogeneous treatment of positive and negative earnings reduces positive 
and negative outcomes by the same percentage, leaving the relation between risk and yield 
unchanged. Although a complete loss offset alleviates the reduction in yield, an investor seeks to be 
compensated for reduced earnings from investment and is attracted by more risk in terms of 
portfolio variance. According to King and Wallin (1990, p. 28.), symmetric (capital income) 
taxation reduces the dispersion of the investment earnings and increases the attractivity of the 
riskier asset to the risk-averse investor. They postulate that taxpayers seek more risk, when there is 
a proportional tax on capital income than when there is no tax.9 To put it simple: Does a change in 
capital income taxation induce an increase in risk-seeking investment behaviour? The second 
hypothesis tests these considerations and can be stated as: 
 
H2: In tax systems with immediate labour taxation (A and B): The switch from tax exempt to 
fully taxable capital income reduces investor’s risk and yield by the same amount. To 
compensate for tax-induced lower earnings from investment, investors will seek more risk 
and select a portfolio with a higher variance. 
  
The third and fourth research hypothesis addresses possible tax framing effects on individual risk-
taking. First, changing the tax rules for labour earnings from immediate to deferral taxation could 
be perceived as a complication in the process of overall income taxation. It might offset the 
assumed increase in the selected portfolio variance, resulting from the change of the tax rules for 
capital income. The third hypothesis equals: 
 
                                                 
9  King and Wallin (1990, p. 29). 
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H3: Tax systems with deferral labour taxation (C and D) complicate determining the exact 
degree of risk-sharing between the investor and the Treasury. A tax system concealing the 
full extent of risk-sharing prevents taxpayers from selecting a portfolio with more risk, when 
the taxation of capital income is changed.  
 
The overall net-of-tax earnings resulting from the combination of deferral labour taxation with 
taxable earnings from investment (tax system B) are identical to those subject to immediate labour 
taxation with tax-exempt earnings from investment (tax system C). Let y  denote the gross labour 
earnings, s  the tax rate applied to labour and investment earnings and r the return on investment, 
then the overall strain on the taxpayer within both tax systems is identical10 and can be stated as:  
( (1 )) (1 ) (1 ) (1 )y r s y s r        . 
When tax framing effects are ruled out, it is reasonable to expect no statistically significant 
difference between individual risk-taking behaviour in terms of the chosen portfolio variance 
between taxpayers within both tax systems. Changing capital income taxation and labour taxation´s 
point of time are mechanism of tax framing. The description and presentation of tax system 
components are assumed to weaken tax system salience and can alter taxpayer´s behaviour. One 
possible explanation is that the lower degree of tax system salience causes a positively biased 
perception. It makes taxpayers believe that they benefit more from lower tax burden by deferral 
taxation than by tax-exempt investment earnings. It is assumed that the deferral aspect of labour 
earnings taxation is more confusing to taxpayers than tax-exemption of investment earnings. This 
way of thinking implies that deferral labour taxation conceals the true tax burden on labour 
earnings, disappearing from taxpayers´ awareness. This perceived decrease of overall taxation 
results in a portfolio with a higher variance relative demand for a portfolio with a higher degree of 
risk. The fourth research hypothesis can be stated as: 
 
H4: Comparing two tax systems putting an equal strain on the taxpayer´s overall earnings but 






                                                 
10 This identity is created within the defined experimental microcosm. The tax rate is invariant over time and certain and 
known to the taxpayers in the present and future.   
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3.2 The Experimental Setting 
Experimental research in economics is widely accepted as an empirical method to approach the 
analysis of tax policy.11 The advantages of experimental research is to provide control and 
knowledge of the economic environment, while producing only low costs to gather evidence on 
how tax incentives may affect individual and aggregate taxpayer behaviour.12  
Instead of providing an exogenous financial endowment, which is to be invested in risky assets, the 
idea is to let the participants work for their earnings to derive a more realistic investment decision 
afterwards. A total of 96 students mostly enrolled in undergraduate business courses volunteered in 
the real effort experiment. The experiment took place in five runs between April 2011 and June 
2011. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the five runs with no more than 25 volunteers 
each. Every single experiment run consisted of two parts, i.e. the real effort part and the investment 
part. The subjects had not been informed of the second part before the experiment started. The 
procedure of each run was identical. Before beginning the task, the subjects were given detailed 
instructions, e.g. as to how to use the computer to do the work, how the work task was rewarded, 
how to end the experiment. Once all instructions had been read, questions were answered. No 
working time restrictions were set.13 Each individual was allowed to quit working whenever they 
wanted. They were required to make a real work-leisure decision, deciding not only on their 
individual work effort but also on their total working time. The cash payment depended on the 
individual work-effort, i. e. the total amount of work, and was received at the end of the task. The 
participants also received a sheet of paper informing them of the tax rate (60%) applied to their 
earnings. The individual task was to digitise solution sheets of a multiple choice exam. Each 
solution sheet that was digitised correctly was rewarded with a gross payment of EUR 0.30. The 
gross wage ranged from EUR 0.30 to 52.80 with a mean of EUR 19.05 for an average time 
commitment of 103.32 minutes and 70.58 digitised solution sheets. When concluding the working 
part, participants were asked to complete a post-experiment questionnaire to gather information 
about their personal background. While their overall earnings before taxes were calculated, the 
subjects were told about the second part of the experiment. It took place in a separate lecture room 
where further instructions and information were handed out to each participant: (1) The gross 
amount of money a subject earned, (2) The one-period investment decision between two assets (3) 
                                                 
11 Alm (2010) surveys and assesses the development of behavioural economics. In particular, he discusses the metho 
dologies, applications and limitations of experimental economics. 
12 See Davis and Swenson (1988, p. 41.) 
13 Only four out of 96 students were willing to work more than the maximum working time of three hours. 
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The particular tax system applied to labour earnings and the earnings resulting from the investment 
in the risky assets. 
Both assets (X and Y) are designed with an identical expected value but a different amount of risk 
(mean preserving spread), each featuring three possible outcomes which are distributed with equal 
probabilities. The outcomes of both assets are stochastically independent. X is the less risky asset 
with only non-negative outcomes. The range of possible outcomes is more spread for Y than for X, 
leading to a higher variance. Asset Y also involves the possibility of a loss with a probability of 1
3
, 
which has important implications with regard to the taxation of profits and losses resulting from 
investment. Assuming risk-averse investors, the lowest variance possible (Var(r)= 0.048) can be 
obtained by allocating an relative amount of 80% to asset X and 20% to Y, meaning a reduction in 
variance by one fifth through asset diversification. It is also controlled for a possible “erroneous” 
demand of taxpayers for the portfolio with the lowest variance. The need to combine the two assets 
to obtain the portfolio with the lowest variance might not be obvious to taxpayers. Therefore, all 
investors (n=22), who decided invest in asset X only, selecting a portfolio variance of 0.06, are 
assigned a “corrected” portfolio variance of 0.048.14 
 





r(medium) p(medium) r(down) p(down) EV(r)   Var(r) 
X  0.6 1/3 0.3 1/3 0 1/3 0.3 0.06 
Y  0.9 1/3 0.3 1/3 -0.3 1/3 0.3 0.24 
Table 2 – Available assets 
 
Four different tax systems were to be tested, differing in two dimensions from each other. Each 
participant was randomly assigned to one tax system, i.e. one tax treatment, on the basis of which 
their individual investment decision was to be made. Labour earnings are either subject to 
immediate or deferral taxation, meaning that labour earnings are subject to taxation before or after 
the investment. Depending on the particular tax system, gross labour earnings ( m ) or net earnings 
( (1 )n m s  ) are the maximum amount available for investment. Moreover, tax systems A & C 
raise taxes on the earnings from on investment, whereas they are tax-exempt in tax systems B & D.  
                                                 






Immediate or deferral 


















Immediate (1 )n m s   Yes (1 (1 ))n r s    
B 
(n=24) 
Immediate (1 )n m s   No (1 ) (1 )m s r    
C  
(n=24) 
Deferral m  Yes (1 ) (1 )m s r    
D  
(n=24) 
Deferral m  No ((1 ) )m s r   
Table 3 – Tax systems and maximal amount to be invested 
 
Under their assigned tax system, each subject had to decide how to allocate their earnings to the two 
assets.15 When choosing between two risky assets with an identical expected return but a different 
amount of risk, participants are implicitly required to weigh the advantage of a possible greater 
return against the disadvantage of a possible negative return. Regarding the net-of-tax amount, the 
following ranking order for positive outcomes can be derived: D C B A   .  
The experimental design is to analyse how the willingness of taxpayers to bear more risk can be 
manipulated by tax policy, not only by capital income taxation but also by labour income taxation. 
After the subjects had determined the proportions to invest in the two assets X and Y, the outcome 
of each asset was determined individually by rolling a dice twice. The subjects completed another 
ex post questionnaire. It included additional questions referring to their investment decision-
making. They were paid privately and left. The subject pay averaged 10.47 euros, requiring a total 
time involvement of 113.78 minutes. 
 
 
                                                 
15 Although investors were assumed to maximise their wealth, participants were also allowed not to invest their 
earnings.  
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4 Empirical findings 
4.1 Group-specific analysis 
The empirical strategy is based on three steps. The first step aims to identify the effect of increased 
initial liquidity on risk-taking behaviour, provided by deferral labour income taxation. The second 
step is a group comparison to identify, whether the change in capital income taxation is perceived 
differently, when immediate or deferral taxation of labour earnings apply. Third, the research 
question whether the demand for riskier portfolios is influenced by tax framing, i.e. redesigning the 
process of income taxation without changing the overall strain on the taxpayers, is addressed. 
 
Table 4 – Tax systems and investment behaviour 
 
Table 3 and 4 present group-specific investment decisions. Table 3 indicates that the number of 
individuals investing in only one or both assets differs substantially between the four groups. Table 
4 depicts the mean portfolio variance for taxpayers, who underlie different tax treatments, revealing 
that risk-taking behaviour is not equal across the tax systems. Under tax system D (deferral taxation 
of labour earnings and tax-exempt earnings from investment) individuals select a portfolio with an 
average variance of 0.163, whereas individuals only select a portfolio with a mean variance of 0.083 
under a tax system with immediate labour taxation and taxable earnings from investment. 
Tax 
system 
Subjects No. of subjects 
investing only in 
risky asset X 
No. of subjects 
investing in X 
and Y  
No. of subjects 
investing only in  
riskier asset Y  
No. of subjects 
investing neither  in X 
nor in Y 
A 24 13 7 3 1 
B 24 6 12 5 1 
C 24 0 15 9 0 
D 24 3 11 10 0 
Total 96 22 45 27 2 
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Mean portfolio variance chosen 
by taxpayers, underlying different 
tax treatments  
Earnings from investment are 
subject to taxation 
 Yes No 
Yes A: 0.083 B: 0.102 Gross labour earnings 
are subject to 
immediate taxation No C: 0.148 D: 0.164 
Table 5 – Tax systems and mean portfolio variance  
 
Testing statistical significance, I initially perform different two-sample proportion t-tests. A two-
sample proportion t-test is helpful to determine whether differences between two proportions of 
independent samples are statistically significant. I conduct pairwise comparisons of different tax 
systems to test H1 –H4.   
With respect to hypothesis H1 comparing tax systems with immediate labour taxation (A and B) 
with those with deferral labour taxation (C to D)), the equality of means can be rejected on a 1% 
level of significance (p-value <0.001). Averaging the respective portfolio variances for A and B 
(0.093) as well as C and D (0.156), the absolute difference turns out to be statistically significant 
positive (>0) with a p-value of 0.035, meaning a relative increase in portfolio variance of almost 
68%. The appealing effect of increased liquidity due to labour income tax postponement is found to 
be empirically verified. A tax system providing an initial increased investment amount make 
investors select riskier portfolios. This result indicates that tax systems with deferral labour taxation 
can be regarded as an incentive to induce taxpayers´ willingness to select riskier portfolios.  
H2 addresses the long-time issue in theoretical as well as empirical work, asserting that risk-averse 
individuals will show more willingness to take risk, when a proportional tax on capital income is in 
effect compared to an environment with capital income taxation. Despite the analytical predictions 
of increased risk-taking behaviour, the level of mean portfolio variance selected by taxpayers under 
tax systems A and B does not differ significantly from each other (p-value=0.491). Imposing a tax 
on investment earnings does not increase the demand for a riskier portfolio and opposes  theoretical 
rigor. This result is in line with the implications of experimental studies by Swenson (1989), King 
and Wallin (1990) and Fochmann et al. (2012), who also found only little (or none) empirical 
support for a positive impact of capital income taxation on individual risk-taking. 
Hypotheses H3 –H4 address tax framing effects. First of all, H3 refers to H2 and cannot be tested 
without referring to the empirical test results for H2. Since in the case with immediate labour 
income taxation there is no empirical support for a positive effect of capital income taxation on risk-
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taking behaviour, testing H3 can neither confirm nor reject the existence of tax framing effects. 
Even in tax systems with the standard approach of immediate labour income taxation, the assumed 
relationship between a proportional capital income tax and individual risk-taking propensity is not 
empirically observable. When there is deferral taxation of labour earnings, the imposition of a 
capital income tax does not lead to less risk seeking by taxpayers, i.e. the selection of portfolios 
with a lower overall variance. In the case with deferral labour taxation, there is also no statistically 
significant difference (p-value= 0.362) between individual risk-taking propensity (in tax systems C 
and D). Modelling the dimension of labour taxation, theoretical predictions about capital income 
taxation and risk-taking are contradicted or at least found to be empirically not verifiable in the 
chosen experimental setting. The lack of empirical support is a strong hint how careful analytical 
findings must be interpreted and transferred to reality. 
With respect to hypothesis H4, tax framing effects are prominent. The equality of means for tax 
systems B and C can be rejected on a 5% level of significance. Moreover, the difference between 
the mean portfolio variances in tax system B and C is positive (>0) on a 5% level of significance (p-
value <0.026). This finding provides clear empirical evidence that tax framing causes a substantial 
perception bias with regard to a tax system´s overall tax burden. Although the information given is 
the same, i. e. overall tax burden remains constant, the introduction of deferral taxation and 
elimination of capital income taxation produces significantly different investment behaviour. Even 
with eliminating economic complexity in the laboratory, the group comparison challenges the view 
that taxpayers are capable to determine their overall tax burden, when different tax rules apply to 
different components in the process of income taxation. Tax framing appears to be one source for 
taxpayers´ lack of unanimous risk-taking behaviour. It is reasonable to assume that tax system 
salience is strongly affected by the realignment of tax rules. The result implies that tax framing 
conceals the overall tax burden, generating a deviation from a pure rational perspective regarding 
risk-taking behaviour.  
Overall, the empirical testing provides strong evidence that the introduction of deferral taxation 
challenges the traditional view how capital income taxation and risk-taking investment behaviour 
are (supposed to be) related. On the one hand, multidimensionality of taxation softens empirical 
evidence by tax framing effects, lowering tax system salience and concealing tax burden visibility. 
On the other hand, my results indicate that the replacement of immediate by deferral labour taxation 
turns out to be a powerful tax policy instrument to foster investment in riskier assets. In line with 
previous findings there is no empirical evidence that capital income taxation fosters individual risk-
taking behaviour as analytical work asserts. 
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4.2 ANOVA/ ANCOVA  
The analysis of variance (ANOVA) offers a more profound testing of hypotheses. It allows 
comparing the means of populations, which are classified in two (or more) different ways. The two-
way ANOVA contains two independent categorical variables or so called factors. In the experiment 
these factors are the “labour income taxation” and “capital income taxation” upon which four 
treatments are formed. The underlying between-subjects design is based on the idea that each 
combination of these factors is applied to a completely new group of subjects. Participants are only 
part of one of the four treatment groups. The dependent variable in two-way ANOVA is the 
selected portfolio variance, resulting from the allocation of disposable earnings to assets X and Y. 
The exploration via a boxplot graphic reveals group-specific patterns in the data. Figure 1 depicts 
statistics about the investment behaviour across the tax systems and visualises its intra- and 



















A B C D
Tax systems
 
Figure 1 – Tax systems and selected portfolio variance 
 
When controlling for other explanatory quantitative variables, the statistic tool is often called the 
analysis of covariance (ANCOVA). It combines elements from regression and analysis of variance.  
ANCOVA includes categorical and continuous variables and allows for the identification of a 
possible interdependency. The ANCOVA basic estimation equation is specified as:   
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The dependent variable is the selected portfolio variance, denoted by vari . It is continuous with 
only non-negative outcomes within a possible range of 0.00 to 0.24. 0 is the unknown intercept, 
1   is the unknown parameter for the factor “labour income taxation” with two levels (deferral 
taxation and immediate taxation). Its abbreviation is def and equals 1 for deferral labour income 
taxation and 0 for immediate labour income taxation. 2 is the unknown regression coefficient for 
the binary factor citax , indicating whether capital income is tax-exempt ( 0citax  ) or taxable 
( 1citax  ). The base category is a tax system with immediate labour taxation and tax-exempt 
earnings from investment, i.e. tax system B. Following the principle of parameter parsimony, the 
model includes five unknown parameters, given by row vector ´k . They refer to socio-demographic 
characteristics contained in column vector iX  for the i-th observation. The metric variable 
disposable earnings  is included as a regressor to control for a possible level effect of the 
underlying gross labour income on the portfolio variance as the dependent variable. An interaction 
between disposable earnings and the factor “labour income taxation” is also included to account for 
a possible interdependence between the aforementioned level effect and the increased liquidity, 
resulting from the postponement of labour income taxation.  Self-estimated personal risk attitude  
with values ranging from 1 to 10 is also included as a regressor.16 The variable age  is measured in 
years and metric; gender is binary and equals 1 for male respondents and 0 for female respondents. 
The latter is the base category.  
Estimation results are presented in Table 5 containing the point estimate and the standard error of 
each covariate. In general, most coefficients are found to be not statistically significant. However, 
the results of ANCOVA indicate a statistically significant and pronounced main effect of the labour 
                                                 
16 The questionnaire contains questions on personal risk attitudes. On a scale from 1 (risk averse) to 10 (risk seeking), 
participants are asked to assess their risk-taking propensity. An indirect query of personal risk preferences via Arrow 
Pratt measure could also have been a valuable alternative. See Huang and Litzenberger (1988) for further 
information. Since the measurement of (self-estimated) personal risk attitudes might be problematic, the basic 
equation was also estimated without the self-estimated risk attitude as a regressor. Estimations results were not 
significantly different in size and direction. 
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income tax treatment. The estimated coefficient for the factor “labour taxation” ( 1ˆ 0.065  ) is 
highly significant with a p-value of 0.025, whereas the factor “capital income taxation” 
( 2ˆ 0.017   ) is neither economically nor statistically significant on a reasonable level of 
confidence. 
 
Covariate Coefficient Standard error P-value 95% Conf. interval 
def      
0 (base)    
1 0.065* 0.028 0.025 0.008 - 0.122 
citax      
0 (base)    
1 -0.017 0.016 0.285 -0.050 - 0.014 
disposable earnings  -0.003 0.002 0.125 -0.007 - 0.001  
disposable earnings def  0.001 0.002 0.671 -0.003 - 0.005 
risk attitude  0.021 0.016 0.189 -0.011 - 0.053 
age  0.001 0.002 0.451 -0.002 - 0.005 
gender      
0 (base)    
1 0.027 0.016 0.095 -0.005 - 0.060 
constant  0.080 0.051 0.117 -0.020 - 0.181 
Note: Asterisks denote the respective significance level at 95% (*), 99% (**) and 99.9 
(***). The Adj. R² is 0.186, Root MSE= 0.0776  
Table 6 – ANCOVA estimates for basic equation 
 
The findings provide empirical evidence that the tax treatments are perceived differently. They are 
not equally eligible to increase taxpayers´ risk-taking propensity, i.e. favouring portfolios with a 
higher overall variance. ANCOVA identifies deferral labour income taxation to be a 
powerful/effective tax incentive to induce more risk-seeking. The change of labour income taxation 
make taxpayers alters their investment allocation between the risky assets fundamentally. On basis 
of immediate labour taxation (as the base category), the taxation of capital income does not affect 
taxpayer´s portfolio selection. Although this result is not in line with most analytical work, similar 
results have been often found in previous studies. The result´s value value for tax policy design 
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cannot be underestimated. It heats up the academic and political debate whether the taxation of 
capital income can be considered as an incentive to foster riskier investment behaviour. Proponents 
of capital income taxation often argue that the Treasury absorbs part of the investor’s risk and can 
be regarded as a partial insurance against possible losses, fostering risk-taking behaviour by 
taxpayers. Controlling for the dimension of labour income taxation, the hypothesis, that risk-sharing 
between the investor and the Treasury is appealing and increases individual risk-taking propensity, 
is clearly not empirically supported. 
From a fiscal point of view, the beauty of deferral taxation is the postponement of taxation, whereas 
the exemption of investment earnings means forgone tax revenues. From a fiscal point of view, 
deferral labour income taxation kills two birds with one stone: it is perceived as an appealing 
incentive to make taxpayers demand riskier portfolios while securing the overall income tax 
revenues in the long-run.  If German tax policy aims to foster risk-seeking investment behaviour on 
income tax revenue- friendly basis, the ANCOVA estimation implies a strong and distinct 
preference for deferral labour taxation. 
Surprisingly, the point estimates for disposable earnings  ( 1ˆ 0.003   ) and the interaction term 
between disposable earnings  and def ( 2ˆ 0.001  ) do not reveal a significant effect on the 
subject´s demand for riskier portfolios. The implications are clear: First, there is no level effect of 
disposable earnings on portfolio selection, meaning that taxpayers, who earned a greater amount of 
gross labour earnings, cannot be statistically distinguished from taxpayers with less gross labour 
earnings regarding their risk-taking behaviour. The insignificant interaction term implies that the 
level effect cannot be induced within tax systems where deferral labour income taxation applies. To 
put it non-technical: Taxpayers with a greater amount of gross labour income do not demand riskier 
portfolios, even if the taxation of their labour income is postponed.    
Predicting the variance of the selected portfolio with ANCOVA is intuitive. A participant (base 
categories for both factors) in a tax system with immediate labour income taxation and tax-exempt 
capital income (tax system B) is expected to select a portfolio with a variance of 0.080. Assuming 
that the factor “labour income taxation” (variable def ) changes its level from zero to one, the 
predicted portfolio variance increases by 0.065 (in absolute terms), meaning almost a doubling of 
portfolio variance. Controlling for the influence of the taxpayer´s gender, the ANCOVA indicates 
that a male participant selects a portfolio variance with 0.107 compared to a female participant. In 
relative terms, this increase slightly exceeds one fourth.  
To test whether the interaction of both factors might be significant, an interaction term is added to 
the above estimation equation. This specification produces no statistically significant result for the 
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interaction of both tax incentives. Reducing the number of model parameters, several other 
specifications are also estimated but do not represent a statistically significant interaction. Even the 
modelling of portfolio variance (the response variable) as a function of def , citax  and their 
interaction does not produce statistically significant results ( See Table A1-A5 in the Appendix for 
further details). Assuming risk-averse investors, it is also controlled for a possible “erroneous” 
demand of taxpayers for the portfolio with the lowest variance. When deciding about the investment 
of disposable earnings, the portfolio with a lowest variance possible (0.048) can be obtained by the 
allocating a relative amount of 80% to asset X and the other 20% to asset Y, whereas the complete 
investment in asset X means a portfolio variance of 0.06. Since this fact not be obvious to 
taxpayers, all investors (n=22) with selected portfolio variance of 0.06 are assigned a “corrected” 
portfolio variance of 0.048. Neither the two-sample proportion t-test nor the ANCOVA have 
produced deviating results with regard to significance and direction of the estimated parameters.17 
Summing up, ANCOVA is a more powerful statistical tool than two-sample proportion t-tests. It 
allows for the estimation of the impact that categorical variables may have on the demand for riskier 
portfolios while also controlling for socio-demographic (continuous) explanatory variables. The 
preferred specification only exhibits a substantial positive influence of one of the main variables of 
interests on taxpayers´ risk-taking investment behaviour. An alternative tax treatment of labour 
earnings turns out to increase taxpayers´ willingness to take risk when they have to make 
investment decisions.  
 
5 Summary and Conclusions 
This study addresses the question as to how different tax systems applied to taxpayers´ labour and 
investment earnings affect the allocation strategy, i.e. the risk-taking behaviour displayed by 
taxpayers. At the core of the experimental analysis are four different designs of a tax system, 
affecting of individual investment behaviour. The tax systems discriminate between the taxation of 
labour earnings and investment earnings. The experimental approach combines a real effort task 
where real money had to be earned with a subsequent investment decision between two risky assets. 
On basis of a real effort experiment, it is a promising and new approach to model and analyse four 
different tax systems featuring deferral taxation of gross earnings in connection with capital income 
taxation. The addition of another income taxation dimension creates a more realistic economic 
environment in the laboratory allows deriving more reasonable behavioural responses than in 
                                                 
17 The two samples proportion tests and ANCOVA estimation results on basis of the adjusted portfolio variances are 
given in the Appendix (A6-A11). 
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previous studies. Although the limitations of experimental tax research are well known and 
sometimes hamper the generalizability of the laboratory results to the field, empirical tax research 
finds its justification in making tax policy recommendations. The implications of this study are 
clear:  
(1) The postponement of taxes on investment or other earnings appears to be an attractive incentive 
to taxpayers´ and lives up to its promise. A primary concern of tax policymakers is the impact of 
tax-deferred contributions on pension plans. My findings provide strong empirical support for tax 
deferral as proper measure to increase these contributions. (2) The study also provides grist to the 
mills of the opponents of a preferential tax treatment of investment earnings. Its much vaunted 
positive externality of influencing taxpayers´ propensity to undertake risky investments has not 
been empirically verified in the laboratory environment, when immediate or deferral labour income 
taxation applies. (3) The balancing act between budget consolidation and setting incentives for 
private investment requires a careful weighing up of different tax policy measures. The ANCOVA 
estimates indicate that deferral taxation of earnings is a powerful tax incentive in fostering risk-
taking behaviour. With regard to income tax revenues, deferral taxation puts less pressure on the 
public budget than the exemption of capital gains from taxation, providing additional strong 
arguments for expanding the application of deferral taxation in modern tax systems. 
Future experimental tax research should focus on the sample size and its composition. Although 
student participants are widely accepted and easily available, a more representative choice of 
participants would shed more light on the results´ validity and improve their transferability to 
reality. Several measures obtained from the same subject would be helpful in many ways. First, 
repeated decision-making in laboratory experiments is useful to identify participants´ learning 
effects and their (in)consistency in decision-making. Second, repeated decision-making creates 
more data on individual (investment) behaviour. This additional information paves the way for 
more elaborate statistical procedures accounting for experimental designs with repeated measures. 
Third, varying the degree of deferral taxation of gross earnings can be implemented in a repeated-
measure design, examining not only heterogeneous responsiveness between subjects but also the 









Table A1. ANOVA only including tax treatments as factors 
Covariate Coefficient Standard error P-value 95% Conf. interval 
def      
0 (base)    
1 0.058*** 0.016 <0.001 0.026 - 0.091 
citax      
0 (base)    
1 -0.016 0.016 0.314 -0.049 - 0.016 
constant  0.086*** 0.014 <0.001 0.058 - 0.114 
Note: Asterisks denote the respective significance level at 95% (*), 99% (**) and 99.9 
(***). The Adj. R² is 0.105, Root MSE= 0.081  
 
Table A2. ANOVA including tax treatments as factors and their interaction 
Covariate Coefficient Standard error P-value 95% Conf. interval 
def      
0 (base)    
1 0.059* 0.023 0.012 0.013 - 0.105 
citax      
0 (base)    
1 -0.015 0.023 0.497 -0.062 - 0.0393 
def cgf  -0.001 0.033 0.957 -0.067 - 0.064 
constant  0.085*** 0.016 <0.001 0.053 - 0.117 
Note: Asterisks denote the respective significance level at 95% (*), 99% (**) and 99.9 









Table A3. ANCOVA basic specification including interaction term of factors 
Covariate Coefficient Standard error P-value 95% Conf. interval 
def      
0 (base)    
1 0.067* 0.033 0.047 0.001 - 0.134 
citax      
0 (base)    
1 - 0.015 0.023 0.517 -0.061 - 0.031 
def exempt  - 0.004 0.032 0.885 -0.070 - 0.060 
disposable earnings  0.032 0.002 0.127 -0.007 - 0.000 
disposable earnings def <0.001 0.002 0.697 -0.003 - 0.005 
risk attitude  0.021 0.016 0.189 -0.054- 0.010 
age  0.001 0.001 0.447 - 0.002 - 0.005 
gender      
0 (base)    
1 0.027 0.016 0.106 -0.005 - 0.060 
constant  0.078 0.052 0.133 -0.024 - 0.182 
Note: Asterisks denote the respective significance level at 95% (*), 99% (**) and 99.9 
(***). The Adj. R² is 0.177, Root MSE= 0.078 
 
 
Table A4. ANCOVA excluding risk attitude, age, gender and interaction term 
Covariate Coefficient Standard error P-value 95% Conf. interval 
def      
0 (base)    
1 0.066* 0.028 0.023 0.009 - 0.124 
citax      
0 (base)    
1 -0.023 0.016 0.143 -0.055 - 0.008 
disposable earnings  0.003 0.002 0.112 -0.007 – 0.000 
disposable earnings def <0.001 0.002 0.706 -0.003 – 0.005 
constant  0.122*** 0.022 0.001 0.077 - 0.167 
Note: Asterisks denote the respective significance level at 95% (*), 99% (**) and 99.9 




Table A5. ANCOVA including interaction term of factors and excluding risk attitude, age and gender  
Covariate Coefficient Standard error P-value 95% Conf. interval 
def      
0 (base)    
1 0.068* 0.033 0.046 0.001 - 0.136 
citax      
0 (base)    
1 -0.022 0.022 0.333 -0.067 - 0.023 
def cgf  0.003 0.032 0.919 -0.066 - 0.062 
disposable earnings  0.003 0.002 0.113 -0.007 - 0.000 
disposable earnings def 0.001 0.002 0.709 -0.003 - 0.05 
constant  0.121*** 0.024 <0.001 0.073 - 0.169 
Note: Asterisks denote the respective significance level at 95% (*), 99% (**) and 99.9 
















Table A6. Two sample proportion tests with adjusted portfolio variance   
Hypothesis Tax systems Means 95% Conf. interval P-values 
1 
 





0.053 – 0.096 vs. 
0.110 – 0.162 
H1a: difference ≠0 
p-value: <0.001 
H1b: difference<0 
p-value:  0.002 




0.088 – 0.166 vs. 
0.108 – 0.181 
H1a: difference ≠0 
p-value: 0.510 
H1b: difference<0 
p-value:  0.255 




0.036 – 0.095 vs. 
0.055 – 0.124 
H1a: difference ≠0 
p-value: 0.275 
H1b: difference<0 
p-value:  0.137 




0.088 – 0.166 vs. 
0.055 vs. 0.124 
H1a: difference ≠0 
p-value: 0.139 
H1b: difference<0 





Table A7. ANOVA only including tax treatments as factors 
Covariate Coefficient Standard error P-value 95% Conf. interval 
def      
0 (base)    
1 0.061*** 0.016 <0.001 0.028 - 0.094 
citax      
0 (base)    
1 -0.017 0.016 0.307 -0.050 - 0.015 
constant  0.082*** 0.014 <0.001 0.054 - 0.111 
Note: Asterisks denote the respective significance level at 95% (*), 99% (**) and 99.9 
(***). The Adj. R² is 0.115, Root MSE= 0.082  
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Table A8. ANOVA including tax treatments as factors and their interaction 
Covariate Coefficient Standard error P-value 95% Conf. interval 
def      
0 (base)    
1 0.061** 0.023 0.010 0.015 - 0.108 
citax      
0 (base)    
1 -0.017 0.023 0.468 -0.063 - 0.029 
def cgf  -0.001 0.033 0.998 -0.066 - 0.066 
constant  0.082*** 0.016 <0.001 0.053 - 0.115 
Note: Asterisks denote the respective significance level at 95% (*), 99% (**) and 99.9 




Table A9. ANCOVA basic specification including interaction term of factors 
Covariate Coefficient Standard error P-value 95% Conf. interval 
def      
0 (base)    
1 0.071* 0.034 0.037 0.004 - 0.139 
citax      
0 (base)    
1 - 0.016 0.023 0.492 -0.063 - 0.030 
def citax  - 0.003 0.033 0.926 -0.069 - 0.063 
disposable earnings  0.029 0.002 0.161 -0.007 - 0.001 
disposable earnings def <0.001 0.002 0.749 -0.003 - 0.005 
risk attitude  0.021 0.016 0.192 -0.054- 0.011 
age  0.001 0.001 0.464 - 0.002 - 0.005 
gender      
0 (base)    
1 0.027 0.016 0.11 -0.005 - 0.061 
constant  0.074 0.052 0.160 -0.030 - 0.179 
Note: Asterisks denote the respective significance level at 95% (*), 99% (**) and 99.9 




Table A10. ANCOVA excluding risk attitude, age, gender and interaction term 
Covariate Coefficient Standard error P-value 95% Conf. interval 
def      
0 (base)    
1 0.071* 0.029 0.016 0.013 - 0.123 
citax      
0 (base)    
1 -0.024 0.016 0.143 -0.056 - 0.008 
disposable earnings  0.003 0.002 0.144 -0.007 – 0.001 
disposable earnings def <0.001 0.002 0.780 -0.003 – 0.005 
constant  0.116*** 0.022 0.001 0.071 - 0.162 
Note: Asterisks denote the respective significance level at 95% (*), 99% (**) and 99.9 
(***). The Adj. R² is 0.166, Root MSE= 0.079  
 
 
Table A11. ANCOVA including interaction term of factors and excluding risk attitude, age and gender  
Covariate Coefficient Standard error P-value 95% Conf. interval 
def      
0 (base)    
1 0.072* 0.034 0.037 0.004 - 0.141 
citax      
0 (base)    
1 -0.023 0.023 0.317 -0.067 - 0.022 
def citax  0.001 0.032 0.960 -0.066 - 0.063 
disposable earnings  0.003 0.002 0.146 -0.007 - 0.001 
disposable earnings def <0.001 0.002 0.782 -0.003 - 0.05 
constant  0.116*** 0.024 <0.001 0.067 - 0.164 
Note: Asterisks denote the respective significance level at 95% (*), 99% (**) and 99.9 
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